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RIGHT OF RECOVERY IN KENTUCKY FOR EMOTIONAL DIS-
TURBANCE OCCASIONED BY NEGLIGENCE
The Kentucky court has developed two rules governing the right
of recovery for emotional disturbance occasioned by negligence. In
social telegram or public carrier cases where duty is based on the
contract a recovery is permitted where the injury alleged is emo-
tional disturbance or has come about by reason of an emotional dis-
turbance. In the absence of such a contractual duty, a recovery is
denied in personal injury cases where there is no contemporaneous
physical impact even where there is an emotional disturbance fol-
lowed by serious physical consequences.
The typical carrier case is that of Dawson v. L. & N. R. R. Com-
pany,' wherein the court said that there could be a recovery for
mental suffering by a sick passenger who was carried past his sta-
tion and rudely treated. A right of recovery has also been recognized
for emotional disturbance resulting from the negligent delay in the
transportation of a corpse- and for the refusal of the servants of a
carrier to stop objectionable and obscene remarks and conduct of a
fellow passenger resulting in humiliation, mortification, annoyance,
discomfort and mental pam.
Chapman v. Western Union Telegraph Company4 is a good illus-
tration of the social telegram case. A telegram informing the plain-
tiff of the serious illness of his father and a subsequent one notifying
him of the latter's death were not delivered due to the negligence of
the defendant company. The court in holding he might recover for
emotional disturbance said, "It seems to us that both reason and
public policy require that it [the telegraph company] should answer
for all injury resulting from its negligence, whether it be to the
feelings or the purse, subject only to the rule that it must be the
direct and proximate consequence of the act." ' Although the contract
here is between the sender and the telegraph company, the court
recognizes an interest of the plaintiff to be secure from emotional
disturbance and gives a redress for the defendant's violation of it.
In view of the above decisions recognizing an interest of the
plaintiff in freedom from emotional disturbances, especially when
it is noted that in a majority of courts recovery is denied in the tele-
'4 Ky. L. Rep. 801 (1883)
'L. &N. R. R. Co. v. I-ull, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 375, 68 S.W 433 (1902).
SL. & N. R. R. Co. v. Bell, 166 Ky. 400, 179 S.W 400 (1915).
190 Ky. 265, 13 S.W 880 (1890) Accord, Western Union Tele-
graph Company v. Van Cleave, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 53, 54 S.W 827 (1900).
090 Ky 265, 271, 13 S.W 880, 881 (1890).
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gram cases,' it seems illogical that recovery should be demed for
emotional disturbances where they cause a serious physical result
solely because there is no contemporaneous physical inpact.
The case best illustrating the position of the Kentucky court is
McGee v. Vanover. In this case the plaintiff's husband, who was at-
tending church with her, was called out by McGd6who commenced
an attack on him. The plaintiff, a pregnant woman, became very
alarmed and rushed out to where they were fighting.Someone hav-
ing separated the two, the plaintiff and her husband were leaving
when another attack was made, in whach Evans, a relative of McGee,
joined him. In the second attack Evans by accident slightly brushed
the plaintiff who later suffered a miscarriage. The Court of Appeals
upheld the verdict against Evans but reversed the verdict against
McGee, saying that there could be no recovery for an emotional
disturbance without physical impact. Here obviously the defendant
who brushed the plaintiff in the affray was less responsible, at least
in the moral sense, for the injury complained of than was the other.
It was the emotional disturbance occasioned by witnessing the at-
tack on her husband, and not the physical impact, which resulted in
the miscarriage suffered by the plaintiff. If there had been no con-
tact at all, the court would have left the woman with no remedy, an
obvious injustice.
The McGee case was not without precedent as the issue had
previously been presented in the case of Morse v. C. & 0. Ry. Co.
In the Morse case, where a train came within fifteen feet of the
plaintiff's yard causing great emotional disturbance, the court in
refusing recovery said, " damages can not be recovered for mental
suffering alone in an action for personal injuries based on negligence,
unaccompanied by some direct contemporaneous injury to person or
property or growing out of some contract relation between the
parties."' In its decision the court quoted extensively from Mitchell
v. Rochester Ry. Co."° which denied recovery for a miscarriage suf-
fered by a plaintiff who became frightened by the approach of the
defendant's team which was so negligently driven that when it was
stopped she was standing between the horses' heads. The New York
court assigned as reasons that since the fright afforded no basis for
an action, its consequences could not; that it would result in a flood
of litigation in cases where the injury complained of could be feigned
without detection and where the damages would rest on mere con-
'PRossER, TORTS (1941) 216.7 148 Ky. 737, 147 S.W 742 (1912).
' 117 Ky. 11, 77 S.W 360 (1903).
'117 Ky. 11, 16, 77 S.W 360, 362 (1903).
" 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354, 34 L. R. A. 781, 56 Am. St. R. 604
(1896). But see Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431
(1931), where the court refused to instruct that if the jury found at
the time of the collision only shock or fright without physical injury
they must find for the defendant, and held that recovery depended
on whether a legal right had been violated.
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jecture or speculation; that such a recovery would be contrary to
public policy; that the negligence could not be said to be the proxi-
mate cause of such an injury; and that for recovery there must be a
violation of some duty and there is no obligation to protect when
unaccompamed by a legal duty. As Green points out in his article,'
the basis of the court's decision in the Morse case is a lack of duty
on the part of the defendant under the particular facts rather than a
blanket rule disallowing recovery to the plaintiff, and while there
might be disagreements with the result reached there could be none
with the legal principle applied. The rule received further support
in the dictum in Reed v. Ford" in which the court, while holding that
the defendant was not negligent, quoted the rule and stated that the
"damages sought to be recovered were too remote and speculative;"
that "the injury was more sentimental than substantial;" and that
"being easy to simulate and hard to disprove," the injury had "no
standard by which it could be justly, or even approximately, com-
pensated." " In its decision of Reed v. Maley,' the court said, "The
objection to a recovery for injury occasioned without physical Im-
pact is the difficulty of testing the statements of the alleged sufferer,
the remoteness of the damages, and the metaphysical character of
the injury considered apart from physical pain."
Mr. Prosser in commenting on the reasons assigned by the vari-
ous courts in denying a recovery for emotional disturbance in ab-
sence of a physical impact says:
"All these objections have been demolished many
times Mental suffering is no more difficult to esti-
mate in financial terms, and no less a real injury than
'physical' pain; it is not an independent, intervening
cause, but a thing brought about by the defendants'
negligence itself, and its consequences follow in un-
broken sequence from that negligence; it is the business
of the courts to make precedent where a wrong calls
for redress, even if law suits must be multiplied, and by
tins time there is precedent enough, and no such in-
crease in litigation is to be observed The problem is
one of adequate proof and it is not necessary to deny
a remedy in all cases because some claims may be
false." X
In spite of the insufficiency of the reasons for the doctrine,
however, Kentucky still adheres to it, but the court has been ex-
tremely liberal in deciding what constitutes an impact.
In the abstract of the decision of City Transfer Co.,v. Robinson '
it is rqported: "Though the right to recover for mental suffering is
"Green, "Fright" Cases (1933) 27 ILL. L. R. 761, 764.
129 Ky. 471, 475, 112 S.W 600, 601 (1908)
1 'Ibid.
14 115 Ky. 816, 819-820, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 209, 210, 74 S.W 1679, 1080
(1903).
' PROSSER, TORTS (1941) sec. 34, pp. 211, 213. See, Note (1935)
24 Ky. L. J. 69.
112 Ky. L. Rep. 555 (1890)
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recognized only in cases where there is also physical injury the ex-
tent of the injury is immaterial; a slight injury may be sufficient.
While the plaintiff in this case says in his testimony- 'I was not hurt,'
yet the facts as he details them show that he did sustain-physical
injury and that he meant that he sustained no serious physical
injury, the court did not err in telling the jury that they might con-
sider the mental suffering as an element of the damage." The court
has also said "by a violent jolt or jar a physical injury may be done
though the flesh is not bruised and there is little externally to indi-
cate it."'7 In Kentucky Traction Co. v. Roman's Guardians a recovery
of $15,000 was allowed for paralysis resulting from emotional dis-
turbance caused by the emission of sparks from a broken trolley
wire on a car in which the plaintiff was riding, although the only
contemporaneous injury was a slight burn from the wire the court
saying, "If there was contact with the wire, no matter how slight
the burns, the plaintiff has a cause of action." "
From the above decisions it is obvious that, while the Kentucky
court states the rule in its narrowest form, its application is liberal.
In allowing recovery in right of privacy cases, breach of promise
suits, slander and libel actions, and for pain in physical injury ac-
tions, the court has demonstrated that it considers that emotional
disturbance is a legal wrong for which redress should be given.
Having a right for which redress is given m other actions it would
seem to be the much better view to allow recovery for injuries re-
sulting from emotional disturbance without insisting on an nnpact,
irrelevant in itself, as a foundatidn on which to base the action. To
hold otherwise permits a real injury to be inflicted by the negligence
of another with impunity. If Kentucky were to adopt the more liberal
rule she would join a very respectable minority of courts-e who,
while permitting recovery, seemingly have not encountered the dif-
ficulties assigned by the Kentucky court as reasons for its rejection.
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"Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v Ban, 161 Ky. 44, 47, 170
S.W 499, 501 (1914).
s232 Ky. 285, 23 S.W 2d 272 (1929).
' 232 Ky 285, 292, 23 S.W 2d 272, 275 (1929). Quare: Could
not she have recovered without impact under the carrier rule?
' Alabama Fuel and I. Co. v Baladom, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So.
205 (1916) Green v Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 73"Atl. 688 (1909),
Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N. W 1034 (1892),
Watkins v. Kaolin Mfg. Co., 131 N. C. 536, 42 S. E. 983 (1902)
Simone v. R. I. Co., 28 R. I. 186, 66 Atl. 202 (1907), Mack v. So.
Bound Ry Co., 52 S. C. 323, 29 S. E. 905 (1898), Sternhagen v. Kozel,
40 S. D. 396, 167 N. W 398 (1918) Memphis St. Ry. Co. v. Bernstein,
137 Tenn. 637, 194 S.W 902 (1917), Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13
S.W 59 (1890), Oliver v. LaValle, 36 Wis. 592 (1875), Dulieu v
White (1901) 2 K. B. 669; Bell v. Gt. No. Ry. of Ore. (1890) 26
L. R. Sc. 428 Gilligan v Robb Sc. 856 (1910)
